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Introduction
Oil prices have changed substantially over the last three decades. Researchers have considered many explanations to account for the long-run behavior of prices, including growing demand from emerging economies, noncompetitive motives by OPEC, resource depletion, and rising extraction costs. To understand which factors are paramount in driving the oil price requires the estimation of cost and demand parameters under di¤erent market structures. Because supply relations and demand function are likely to move simultaneously as a result of exogenous shifters (like income and technological factors), econometric methods such as instrumental variables should be used to estimate these parameters. Unfortunately, the application of these methods to the oil market has proven di¢ cult. 1 We use the dominant …rm-competitive fringe textbook model (OPEC versus the group of non-OPEC producers) and estimate signi…cant elasticities over the sample period 1986-2009 that correct for the simultaneity bias by using standard IV methods. We document that OPEC exercised market power during the sample period. We show that it is critical to correctly specify the market structure to obtain signi…cant elasticities.
In our model, demand is standard, depending on the current oil price and world GDP, but we depart from standard supply analysis by assuming that one group of oil producers, OPEC, can exert market power, whereas the non-OPEC oil producers act as a competitive fringe. Once OPEC sets the price of oil, total demand and the fringe's supply are determined, and OPEC is faced with the residual demand: total demand less the competitive supply. OPEC sets the price that maximizes its total pro…ts, taking into account the impact of its pricing decision on the residual demand. This choice leads to a nonlinear price-setting rule. We use quarterly data from 1986 to 2009 and estimate a simultaneous system of three equations, using nonlinear instrumental variable methods with world GDP, the production costs for OPEC and non-OPEC producers as exogenous demand and supply shifters. Our results suggest that the nonlinearity induced by OPEC's markup is of key importance in modeling oil prices.
Our results suggest that the dominant …rm model provides a fair representation of the oil market: all structural parameters have the expected sign and are statistically signi…cant with exceptional of OPEC marginal cost elasticity. We estimate a long-run price elasticity of demand of 0:39, which is somewhat larger than previous estimates reported in the literature; see, for example, Dahl (1993) , Gately and Huntington (2002) , and Cooper (2003) . Our estimate of the income elasticity of demand is 1.52, which is higher than previous estimates in the Gately and Huntington 2002 study (0.55 for OECD 1 Hamilton (2009) summarizing the literature writes "In any given year, both the demand curve and supply curve are shifting as a result of these factors (income and last year's prices, supply factors and others), and one cannot simply look at how price and quantity move together to infer anything about the slope of either curve. The common methodology of including lagged dependent variables in OLS regressions to distinguish between short-run and long-run responses is also problematic." countries and 1.17 for non-OECD countries including China and India), Graham and Glaister (2004) , and other studies. This result partly re ‡ects the high GDP growth rates of China and India during most years of our 1986-2009 data period, which is not a feature in most of the previous studies. We …nd a non-OPEC supply elasticity of 0.25, and further that the marginal cost of oil production is lower for OPEC than for non-OPEC producers.
Because the demand and non-OPEC supply elasticities are statistically signi…cant, we obtain a tight estimate for the degree of OPEC's market power-we …nd evidence that OPEC exerted substantial market power in the period analyzed.
To gain insight about the role of OPEC's markup for our estimation results, we reestimate the model under the assumption that OPEC is a price taker. With a competitive model we obtain an insigni…cant (and marginally positive) demand elasticity-a similar result has been obtained in some previous studies, such as Lin (2011) . Using the competitive model we also obtain a lower income elasticity (around 0.5) and …nd an insigni…cant factor price elasticity for OPEC. The di¤erence between the results obtained from the competitive model and the dominant …rm model re ‡ects the nonlinear response induced by OPEC's markup on its residual demand. In our model OPEC's markup is not a constant; it is a function of parameters (to be estimated) and endogenous variables.
Using our estimates, we examine the contribution of world GDP and production costs to the long-run trend in oil prices and quantities during our sample period from 1986 to 2009. We …nd that changes in world GDP explain most of the growth in oil prices and quantities, but the recent rise in production costs is also responsible for higher prices after 2004.
We make three contributions to the literature on crude oil prices. First, there is a large literature on estimating the relationship between oil demand and the price of oil and also the relationship between supply of oil and the price of oil; see, for example, Gri¢ n (1985), Kaufmann (2004) , Hansen and Lindholt (2008) , Kaufmann et al. (2008) , and Bremond et al. (2012) . These papers do not account for the simultaneity of supplyand-demand changes. Hamilton (2008) argues that for some periods these estimates are probably good approximations, but in general they are subject to instabilities. Studies that have taken an instrumental variables approach, as we do, are scarce-some examples are Alhajji and Huettner (2000) , Almoguera and Herrera (2007) , and Lin (2011) . We contribute to this literature by providing signi…cant demand and supply elasticities using a simple nonlinear system IV estimator.
Second, our paper is related to the literature that tests di¤erent market structures in the oil market; more speci…cally, the degree to which OPEC can control prices. Gri¢ n (1985) is a seminal paper in this …eld. In testing whether OPEC is a cartel, Gri¢ n starts out assuming that OPEC is a dominant …rm that sets the price of oil. However, the residual demand function, as well as a …rst-order condition for OPEC, are not part of the empirical model. Alhajji and Huettner (2000) and Hansen and Lindholt (2008) also refer to the dominant …rm model, but once again, OPEC's price-setting rule is not part of the empirical model in these papers. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the …rst one to estimate the simultaneous dominant …rm model for the oil market.
Whereas Gri¢ n (1985) concludes that most OPEC countries act as members of a cartel, evidence of OPEC's ability to in ‡uence the price of oil is mixed. Papers in the 1980s and 1990s argued in favor of collusive behavior, see Almoguera and Herrera (2007) , but later studies, using extended data, found mixed evidence of whether OPEC has exerted market power. For example, Spilimbergo (2001) …nds no support for the hypothesis that OPEC, except for Saudi Arabia, was a market-sharing cartel during the 1983-1991 period, whereas Smith (2005) …nds that OPEC's market behavior lies between a non-cooperative oligopoly and a cartel. For other studies, see Jones (1990) , Gulen (1996) and Bremond et al. (2012) , and also Smith (2009) for a review of the literature.
Third, using the model's parameters we show that growth in world GDP has been the main driving force of oil price increases over the last two decades, but that recently rising production costs have contributed signi…cantly to higher oil prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to document the relative importance of demand and supply factors for the long-run behavior of oil price. In contrast, some studies, like Killian (2009), assume that supply is …xed, which is reasonable in the short run. Our paper also complements results from the empirical industrial organization literature on measuring the extent of market power (see Bresnahan (1989) for a survey). Our work is closest to Suslow (1986) , which documents market power in the aluminium industry.
The paper is divided into six sections. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the crude oil market, and in Section 3 we describe the empirical framework used to estimate the model. Our main results are presented in Section 4. Here we compare our estimated elasticities to those reported in the literature and discuss the …t of the model. We also analyze the relative importance of world income and costs of extraction as the driving forces of the oil price. In Section 5 we perform a number of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
The Crude Oil Market
In this section we describe the data sources and characterize the crude oil market, focusing mainly on the period that will be analyzed later in the paper. World production of crude oil plus the change in the OECD stock of crude oil is used as a measure for total consumption of (demand for) crude oil. For non-OPEC production costs we use U.S. costs of production, which we believe is a conservative estimate: among the non-OPEC producers, U.S. producers have the highest cost, see Alhajji and Huettner (2000) . The source for the non-OPEC cost of production is U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012b) which compiles a Producer Price Index for production costs in the United States. We set the nominal production cost for non- 2008) we also use data for OPEC extraction capacity; these are obtained from Kaufmann (2005) . Finally, we use the quarterly world GDP index from Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001), and then we transform it into levels using annual GDP from the World Bank (2013). The series is de ‡ated by the U.S. CPI.
Data

Development in the oil market
In this subsection we describe the main price development in the global oil market since 1973.
Panel (a) in Figure 1 plots the real price of oil (measured in 1996 USD). The …gure covers most of the turbulent period between 1973 and 1986, encompassing the huge increase in the oil price that occurred in 1973 when prices rose from 14 to 33 USD per barrel (frequently referred to as OPEC 1). It also includes the sky-high prices around 1979-1980 of roughly 70 USD per barrel (OPEC 2), and the substantial decrease in the oil price during the …rst half of the 1980s. It is beyond the scope of the present article to discuss this early period -the price path in this period probably re ‡ects structural shocks on the supply side. Rather, our focus centers on the period after 1985, which we believe is characterized by less abrupt changes in the crude oil market.
As seen from panel (a) , the real oil price was roughly in the range of 15 to 25 USD per barrel from 1986 to 1998, except for the peak in 1990:Q3-1991:Q1, a rise that can be attributed to supply disruptions stemming from the Gulf War. Beginning in 1999, the oil price increased steadily and peaked at 88 USD per barrel in 2008:Q2, then dropped to around 40 USD due to the …nancial crisis.
Panel (b) shows that the total production of oil has increased steadily after 1985.
In this period, non-OPEC production did not change much, but there was a drop in production in the early 1990s, re ‡ecting the contraction of the energy industry in the former Soviet Union. The two plots in panel (b) imply that the OPEC's market share increased from 30 percent in 1986 to 40 percent in 1992 (see Figure 1 panel (c) ), where it has largely remained since then. One simple way to examine the relationship between global oil consumption and world GDP is to calculate the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate for the correlation between changes in world GDP and changes in world oil consumption. As shown in Figure 4 , we obtain 0.53 for 1986-1997 and 0.54 for 1998-2009 ( 0:65 for 1973-1985) , suggesting that the income elasticity of the price of oil did not change signi…cantly over the period. Therefore, it seems reasonable to specify a constant income elasticity in the econometric model. We return to this issue in Section 5.
Empirical Models for the Crude Oil Market
In this section we present two structural models for the crude oil market that di¤er in the degree to which OPEC exerts market power. We start by describing the building blocks common to both models, such as world demand and the non-OPEC competitive supply.
Then, for the competitive model we assume that OPEC takes the price as given. Finally, we introduce the dominant …rm model where OPEC sets the price of oil.
Theoretical framework
Consider the inverse demand function for oil,
where P is the real price of oil, Q w is world demand for oil, and Y is world GDP.
We assume there are two groups of oil producers, OPEC countries (o) and non-OPEC countries (no). The latter group is assumed to be price takers, and thus its …rst-order condition, derived from pro…t maximization, requires that the oil price is equal to the marginal cost (M C) of production:
Here, Q no is non-OPEC production, which we assume has an increasing marginal cost, W no is the input cost for non-OPEC producers, and T no is a measure of other factors that may have impact on cost of production, for example, resource availability and technological progress.
Below we consider two alternative hypotheses for OPEC production: (i) OPEC has market power (the benchmark case) and (ii) OPEC is a price taker. In the latter case, the …rst-order condition for OPEC is of course similar to (2):
where
is OPEC production (
Alternatively, OPEC is not a price taker. This hypothesis takes into consideration that OPEC's production has an impact on the price of oil: if OPEC production increases, then, ceteris paribus, the price of oil will decrease, and therefore non-OPEC extraction will decrease. Formally, equation (2) can be rewritten as
which implicitly de…nes the function
OPEC maximizes pro…ts, taking (5) into account, that is, OPEC maximizes
is the total cost of OPEC production. Under the assumption of an internal solution, that is, positive production from both OPEC and non-OPEC producers, OPEC's …rst-order condition can be speci…ed as price should be a markup above marginal cost,
where the markup m is de…ned as
Here, = @P @Q w An alternative representation (see Bresnahan (1982) ) of the …rst-order condition, which we will use later, is given by 3 The elasticity of the residual demand facing OPEC is
where is referred to as the market power index. This index embeds several cases: = 0 corresponds to perfect competition, = 1 corresponds to monopoly, and 0 < < 1 corresponds to intermediate cases like Cournot competition and a dominant …rm with a competitive fringe (our benchmark case). 4 
Empirical Implementation
Under both market structures (dominant …rm and competitive), we have a simultaneous system of equations that determine oil production in OPEC and non-OPEC countries, total oil production, and the world price of oil. To …t the model to the data, the next step is to incorporate speci…c functional forms.
Speci…cation
We assume that world (w) demand for oil is given by a log-linear function:
where D t is a vector of dummies. Further, u i t ; i = w; no; o; is an error term assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero mean and variance Watson (1993). 5 Demand theory suggests that 1 = < 0 and 2 > 0:
The non-OPEC group is a price taker, and they therefore set marginal cost equal to price, see equation (2) . Assuming that marginal cost is log-linear 6 , the supply of non-OPEC production is also log-linear:
4 As pointed out in Bresnahan (1982) , if both demand and marginal cost are linear in quantity, then estimation of a relation of type (8) will identify the gross e¤ect of quantity, which consists of two terms: the unit cost of OPEC production and the factor @P @Q w : Hence, it is not possible to identify . 5 To test whether there is cointegration in the data we proceed in two steps. First, we show that …ve out of the six variables used in the estimation are nonstationary. We applied the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. We show that for all variables we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% signi…cance level. Then, we establish that there are up to …ve cointegration relationships in the data. We use the Johansen unrestricted cointegration rank test (trace test). We …nd that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector (rank( ) = 0) is strongly rejected, and that there is some evidence of more than three cointegrating vectors. See more details in the Appendix A.1. 6 Implicitly, we allow for non-homothetic cost function in factor prices and output. Constant return to scale technology would imply independence of the marginal cost with respect to production. where 1 = > 0 and 2 < 0 according to standard economic theory. Further, W no is the input cost of non-OPEC production, and V no t is a vector of (other) supply shifters for non-OPEC.
Also for OPEC we assume that marginal cost is log-linear. We consider two alternative hypotheses for OPEC (see Section 3.1). First, OPEC acts competitively, and thus its supply function is given by
where V o t is a vector of supply shifters for OPEC, which includes lagged di¤erences of ln W o (input cost of OPEC production). In (12) (3) . The basic idea is that cost of production depends on the geology of the oil …elds; whether it is cheap or costly to extract oil. If, hypothetically, an oil producer does not …nd more oil and he extracts from the cheapest …elds before he moves on to more expensive …elds, then cost of production should increase over time.
Alternatively, if more …elds are discovered and these have lower costs than the remaining non-exhausted …elds, or the rate of technological progress in oil extraction exceeds the rate of technological progress for the general economy, then cost of extraction should decline over time. Due to limited data, we use OPEC capacity to pick up this "time trend". Note that economic theory cannot be used to sign this trend. 7 Alternatively, OPEC acts as a dominant …rm with a competitive fringe-the non-OPEC suppliers. Then, quantity is set so that the price exceeds the marginal cost of production. Using equations (6), (7), (10), and (11), we obtain
It is crucial that the markup is a nonlinear function of the parameters 1 and 1 . The model is therefore nonlinear in the parameters to be estimated-this topic is explored in the next subsection.
Using the speci…ed functional forms, the market power index becomes (see (9))
We will use this expression to measure the degree of market power exerted by OPEC.
Estimation Methods
Now we describe how we estimate the parameters under the two alternative market structures. First, in the competitive model where OPEC is a price taker, we estimate the structural parameters c = [ ; ; c ] using equations (10), (11), and (12). Then, for the dominant …rm speci…cation, where OPEC charges a markup over the residual demand, we estimate the parameters d = ; ; d using equations (10), (11), and (13). In both cases, the vector of instrument variables is
When OPEC is assumed to be a price taker, the moment condition function g( c ) is de…ned as
where X w ; X no , and X o c are vectors of the right-hand side variables in equations (10), (11), and (12), respectively. When estimating this system of three equations, we use three-stage least squares (3SLS). The parameter estimates b c are obtained by solving
where the weighting matrix c W is evaluated at (Z 0 Z) 1 in the …rst step and at (Z
in the second step, and
Because this model is linear, system general method of moments (GMM) estimation is equivalent to 3SLS. 9 When estimating the dominant …rm model, we use system nonlinear instrumental variable method (henceforth referred to as NLIV) with the following moment condition 8 We have also included the demand and supply shifters V w t ; V no t , and V o t . The latter may a¤ect costs of extraction for OPEC, for example because of changes in the composition of oil …elds. 9 We have
N is the covariance matrix of the residuals from 2SLS where N is the number of observations. The variance matrix can be obtained from
where X o d is the vector of the right-hand side variables in equation (13) 
Results
In this section we present the paper's main results. First, we show the estimated elasticities for the dominant …rm model (our benchmark) and compare these with the estimates from the competitive model. Then, we explore the …t of the dominant …rm model and identify which factor has been the main driver of the crude oil price. Third, we provide evidence for OPEC's exertion of market power during the 1986-2009 period.
Elasticities
Here we report the estimates from our two speci…cations. The second column in Table 1 shows our estimates for the dominant …rm model -equations (10), (11) , and (13) -using the nonlinear instrumental variable method. We have included quarterly dummies, one dummy for wars in the Middle East 11 and another dummy for the former Soviet Union 12 .
To account for potential cointegration in the data (see Stock (13) . 13 The third column in Table 1 shows the estimates from the competitive model -equations (10), (11), and (12) -using 3SLS. We use the same instruments and dummy variables as in the estimation of the dominant …rm model. 10 The variance of this estimator is given by
The war dummy equals 1 for the period of the Iran-Iraq war 1986:Q1-1988:Q2 and also 1 during the invasion of Kuwait (1990III-IV), and is zero otherwise. 12 The former Soviet Union dummy equals 1 for the period 1986:Q1-1990:Q2, re ‡ecting the contraction of the energy industry in this country during that period, and zero otherwise. 13 We use the same number of lags in both the dominant …rm and the competitive model. The number of lags (…ve) is based on the AIC index from the dominant …rm model, see Section 5 for a discussion on the importance of lags wrt. the estimation results. Gately and Huntington (2002) estimate income elasticities for the 1971-1997 period for di¤erent types of countries. In that study, the average income elasticity for 25 OECD countries is 0.55, but 1.17 for 11 non-OECD countries characterized by rapid income growth, and 1.11 for 11 oil-exporting countries. This suggests that income elasticities are greater than one for several non-OECD countries, and may therefore partly explain why our estimate, which is based on data for all countries, exceeds one. However, other reasons why we obtain such a high income elasticity may be related to the data period, type of data and number of lags; see the discussion in Section 5.
Non-OPEC supply. For non-OPEC producers we obtain a supply elasticity of 0.25, meaning that a one percent increase in the crude oil price will increase extraction from the non-OPEC producers by 0.25 percent. There are not many estimates of the non-OPEC supply elasticity in the literature. One exception is the Alhajji and Huettner (2000) study that obtained 0.29, which is close to our result. Turning to the factor price supply elasticity of non-OPEC, our estimate is 1:05, that is, a one percent increase in the unit cost of extraction leads to a nearly equal reduction in non-OPEC production.
OPEC price-setting equation. We estimate a marginal cost elasticity for OPEC (
65; this estimate is, however, insigni…cant at the …ve percent test level. However, we can still examine whether the slope of marginal cost for OPEC and non-OPEC di¤ers: a simple one-sided t-test suggests that at …ve percent signi…cance level the slope of marginal cost for non-OPEC is larger than for OPEC. This could be due to competitive advantages since reserves are more accessible and cheaper to exploit in OPEC than in non-OPEC countries. The OPEC factor price elasticity (
is estimated to 0.99, whereas the elasticity of the marginal cost of OPEC with respect to OPEC capacity (
is estimated to 2:73: This estimate, which is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5 percent test level, suggests strong technological progress in extraction of oil and/or discovery of cheaper oil …elds among OPEC members. If OPEC production increases, then, ceteris paribus, the market price will fall, which will lower non-OPEC production, thereby modifying the initial price reduction. We call this equilibrium e¤ect the OPEC production elasticity (
, and it is straightforward to identify it in our framework. Our estimate is 0:74, and the standard error is 0.06. 14 Our estimate for the market power index is 0.73, which is clearly above zero and sharply estimated. 15 This suggests that OPEC exerts market power; we will return to this issue in Section 4.3.
Finally, using our estimated parameters we …nd that the OPEC's markup varies between 1.9 and 7.1 with a mean of 4.2, that is, far above one, which is indeed consistent 14 Notice that
The equilibrium elasticity is evaluated at the mean of the OPEC market share s o . The standard error is computed using the delta method. Note that b o = 1 0:74 < 1 at equilibrium. 15 The market power index is evaluated at the mean of the OPEC market share s o . The standard error is computed using the delta method. with theory. 16 
OPEC as a Competitive Supplier
We now turn to the estimation of the competitive model: by comparing the benchmark model with the competitive model we can quantify the misspeci…cation bias induced by not accounting for OPEC taking into consideration that non-OPEC supply depends on its own level of production, see equation (5) . The competitive model is estimated using
3SLS.
Demand. As seen from the last column in Table 1 , the demand elasticity has the wrong sign, but it is low and insigni…cant; 0.01 (0.01) versus 0:39 (0.02) in the benchmark case. 17 In the competitive model the estimated income elasticity is 0.51, which is much smaller than the 1.52 estimate in the benchmark case. This suggests that no accounting for non-competitive market structure in the speci…cation leads to bias in the estimates of the demand elasticity and income elasticity.
Non-OPEC supply. The supply elasticity of non-OPEC is estimated to 0.11, which is smaller than in the dominant …rm model (0.25). Likewise, the factor price elasticity of non-OPEC is also smaller (in absolute value) when OPEC is assumed to act competitively ( 0:43) than in the benchmark case ( 1:05).
OPEC supply. When OPEC is assumed to act competitively, its estimated supply elasticity is 0.16, which is small but somewhat higher than the supply elasticity of non-OPEC (0.11). The factor price elasticity of OPEC is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero.
In summary, the insigni…cant factor price elasticity of OPEC, as well as the insignificant demand elasticity, should cast doubt about the use of the competitive model and also the use of linear (in logs) models when modeling oil prices. In the remaining part of the paper we therefore focus on the dominant …rm model.
Fit of the Dominant Firm Model
Using the parameters of the dominant …rm model we perform two simulation experiments.
First, we evaluate the …t of the model, using the exogenous variables for the 1986-2009 sample period. Then, we perform two counterfactual experiments to explore the 16 Recall that in our estimation we have imposed that the markup is positive, that is, strictly greater than a small epsilon. Our point estimates clearly meet this restriction. 17 The estimate of the demand elasticity in the competitive model can be compared with Krichene (2006) , who estimates a simultaneous equations model for world crude oil demand and competitive oil supply. Krichene applies 2SLS to estimate short-run elasticities, and error-correction methods (ECM) to estimate the long-run demand elasticity using annual data from 1970 to 2005. He …nds the demand elasticity to vary across countries, ranging from 0:03 to 0:08, which roughly resembles our result for the competitive model; no price e¤ect on demand.
relative importance of income and cost when explaining the long-run trends of price and quantities.
In-sample prediction. Figure 5 shows the in-sample prediction of the dominant …rm model, which tracks the main trends in the market reasonably well but understandably misses some deviations from the trend. In particular, the dominant …rm model very 
OPEC' s Market Power
So far we have documented that OPEC's market power index is high. Now, we will measure the degree of OPEC's market power in more detail and provide a descriptive indication of the level of pro…ts enjoyed by OPEC using the standard Lerner index.
Recall from Section 3.1 that we can rewrite OPEC's …rst-order condition as in equation (8) with the market power index given by equation (14) . From equation (8) Table 1 . This clearly suggests that di¤ers from zero.
Is it possible to test whether OPEC has market power? As a …rst attempt we use a standard Wald test. Then our null hypothesis is that OPEC is a price taker in a competitive oil market; that is, H o : = 0: The Wald statistic is 1166.7, and thus the null hypothesis of a competitive oil market is rejected at a one percent signi…cance level.
However, we cannot test the hypothesis that OPEC acts noncompetitively because our model does not nest the competitive case; we have assumed that OPEC is a dominant …rm that takes into consideration how the fringe responds to its production decisions, as shown in equation (5) . 18 We can, however, compute con…dence intervals for the market power index, which will give information about OPEC's degree of market power, in particular how far its market power index is from zero.
Because the market power index is nonlinear in the parameters and is not de…ned at zero, we rely on bootstrap methods to compute its sampling distribution. In particular, we compute con…dence intervals using quantiles from the empirical sampling distribution.
First, we use re-sampling methods for the residuals to generate bootstrap data. In each iteration j, j = 1; : : : ; 10000, we keep the exogenous variables …xed as in the data, and recompute the endogenous variables [ln Q w t ; ln Q no t ; ln P t ] : Then, for each iteration we estimate the model and use equation (14) to compute b j ( denotes the estimate from the bootstrap process), see Appendix A.2 for more details. The set of all b j is the empirical distribution of b . Finally, we construct the 99th percentile con…dence interval (one for each year) using the bootstrap sampling distribution of b : Figure 7 , which shows the con…dence intervals for the market power index, reveals a signi…cant degree of OPEC market power. In particular, for the entire sample period the lower ends of the 99th percentile con…dence intervals are by far above zero.
As an alternative to using the market power con…dence index, we can calculate the 18 Technically, the null H 0 : = 0 is not feasible in our model. standard Lerner index L t . Using equation (8) we …nd
We …nd that the Lerner index had a positive trend between 1986 (51 percent) and 1998 (83 percent). This trend is entirely driven by changes in OPEC's market share because in our model the elasticities are constant. Note that
, that is, the absolute value of the OPEC production elasticity increased over time in this period.
After 1998, the Lerner index varied between 70 percent and 84 percent. For the entire 1986-2009 period, the average Lerner index was 74 percent.
Further Analysis
We now examine how our estimates change with respect to di¤erent econometric speci…-cations and data used. First, we explore the robustness of our estimates when we allow for di¤erent lags in the correction term. Second, we investigate how the estimates vary between subperiods. This shed light on parameter shifts due to structural changes in demand and supply. Third, we study the impact of assuming that consumer prices di¤er from producer price. Finally, we check whether our estimates change when we use OECD data instead of world data. We use this exercise to compare with previous studies that have used OECD data.
Lags
It is standard to include lags in oil market studies; for example, Hansen In the benchmark case we used …ve lags; this is the speci…cation with the highest AIC index. 19 Table 2 shows that the estimated coe¢ cients for demand and non-OPEC supply are robust with respect to number of lags. For example, the estimate of the demand elasticity varies between 0:31 (no lag) and 0:40 (two lags). On the other hand, the estimated OPEC parameters are sensitive to the lag speci…cation. For example, the OPEC factor price elasticity is slightly negative and insigni…cant in the static version of the model (no lag), but around one and signi…cant with at least two lags. The lack of stability may re ‡ect poor data, for example, the covariate OPEC extraction capacity may not be a good measure of the time trend in oil extraction. Alternatively, the model may 19 For six or more lags, Matlab was not able to estimate this non-linear model. be misspeci…ed as it does not allow for dynamic behavior; for example, a higher OPEC capacity may be taken as a signal by non-OPEC producers of a permanent increase in future OPEC production, which will lower the price of oil. Non-OPEC producers may then change its extraction path by speeding up present extraction.
Data period
In our estimations, we assumed constant parameter values over the data period 1986:Q1-2009:Q4. This may be a strong assumption because of structural changes in demand and supply. For example, over time a higher share of crude oil has been used in the transportation sector, which, according to prior studies, has a lower demand elasticity than other oil-consuming sectors (end-user demand and power generation). Similarly, rapid growth in some Asian countries has increased this region's share of global oil consumptionthese countries may have a di¤erent demand structure than OECD countries, and also a higher income elasticity of oil, see the discussion above. For OPEC, the energy and environmental policy in OECD countries and discoveries of unconventional petroleum deposits in non-OPEC countries may have a powerful impact on its ability to act as a pro…t-maximizing cartel, which may lead to structural changes on the supply side.
To investigate the variation in the parameters across periods, we divide the data period into two subperiods; 1986-1997 and 1998-2009, and estimate the benchmark model separately for each of these subperiods, see Table 3 . When splitting the original time period into two subperiods, the two estimates of the demand elasticity do not di¤er much 
The consumer price of oil
In the analysis we have used the crude oil price as an explanatory variable for both oil producers and oil consumers; this is standard in the literature. However, consumers face a much higher price of oil than producers; the di¤erence re ‡ects costs (and pro…ts) of re…neries, costs (and pro…ts) of transport of crude oil and oil products, and taxes (value added, energy and environmental taxes, etc.).
Energy Prices and Taxes from the IEA provides information on consumer prices of oil by country, sector and oil product. Using IEA (1990), IEA (1995), IEA (2002) and IEA (2011) we construct an OECD consumer oil price where we aggregate over sectors (households, services, industry and transport) and oil products (light fuel oil, heavy fuel oil and automotive diesel). We use information from IEA (2010) on consumption of oil products (by sector) as weights. Figure 8 shows the di¤erence between the OECD consumer price of oil and the crude oil price (in 1996 USD). In 1986 the di¤erence was around 55 USD per barrel, and it increased to around 65 USD in the …rst part of the 1990s. Later, it fell to 50 USD before it peaked at 80 USD in 2007. Roughly, the OECD consumer price of oil is twice as high as the crude oil price.
Ideally, we should use a weighted average of the consumer price of oil for OECD countries and the consumer price of oil for non-OECD countries when estimating demand for oil. Energy Prices and Taxes provides detailed price information for all OECD countries (see discussion above), but the information on non-OECD countries is by far too limited to be of practical use for the present paper. While the consumer price of oil may di¤er between OECD and non-OECD, for example due to di¤erent tax levels, the changes in the consumer price of oil may not di¤er that much between the OECD and the non-OECD; they both depend on the crude oil price, costs of re…neries, costs of transport, etc. We therefore believe that using the OECD consumer price of oil as the explanatory variable for OECD as well as for non-OECD oil consumers may provide better estimates than using the crude oil price as the consumer price of oil for all consumers (the benchmark case). Table 4 shows the estimates when we use the OECD consumer price of oil (instead of the crude oil price) as an explanatory variable. 20 In general, for most elasticities the change is small; the demand elasticity is now -0.47 (-0.39 in the benchmark case), the non-OPEC supply elasticity is 0.16 (0.25 in the benchmark case), and the market power index is 0.83 (0.73 in the benchmark case). Note, however, that the income elasticity is now 0.99 (1.52 in the benchmark case), that is, more in line with other studies, see discussion above. 21 
OECD countries
Above, we pooled all countries in the world to examine the relationship between global consumption of oil, world GDP, and the price of oil. Due to lack of data, some earlier 20 In each year the quarterly changes in the OECD consumer price are assumed to be identical to the quarterly changes in the crude oil price. 21 An alternative view is that changes in oil taxation in OECD countries have di¤ered so much from the development in oil consumer prices in non-OECD countries that the crude oil price is a better proxy for the non-OECD consumer price than the OECD consumer price. In that case we may underestimate the income elasticity by using the OECD consumer price also for non-OECD countries. studies used OECD oil consumption and/or OECD GDP instead of global oil consumption and global GDP to estimate elasticities; see, for example, Alhajji and Huettner (2000) and Almoguera and Herrera (2007) .
In order to shed some light on what kind of biases the use of OECD data may lead to, in Table 5 we have reestimated our benchmark model with OECD data for the 1986-1997 period. As seen from Table 5 , for some elasticities, for example, the demand elasticity and the non-OPEC supply elasticity, the results for the two cases do not di¤er much, whereas for other elasticities the di¤erence is large. In particular, the estimated income elasticity is now 0.48, which is much lower than the 1.32 estimate obtained with global data. This could re ‡ect the growth in China and India after 1990 (see Figure 2 ) that OECD data do not pick up.
Finally, the estimate of the non-OPEC supply elasticity using OECD data is slightly lower than the estimate obtained with world data. However, the estimate of the factor price elasticity for non-OPEC is around zero and insigni…cant with OECD data but clearly negative (-0.62) and almost signi…cant at the …ve percent test level with world data. This highlights the importance of using world data.
Conclusions
Oil prices have changed dramatically over the last decade. Since the work of Gri¢ n (1985), di¤erent studies have tested a variety of market structures using di¤erent econometric techniques, data, and models. The results have been mixed, with parameters not being robust to the speci…cation of the model or the sample period, or simply insigni…cant.
In particular, the demand elasticity has proven di¢ cult to estimate reliably.
In this paper we estimate a parsimonious dominant …rm model for the global crude oil market. OPEC is envisioned to be a dominant …rm, setting its price as a markup over residual demand, and non-OPEC countries act as a competitive fringe. The model is estimated using a system of three equations with OPEC's price response being nonlinear (in logs).
We …nd signi…cant estimates for most of the long-run parameters of the model. In particular, signi…cant demand and non-OPEC elasticities allow us to measure the degree of OPEC's market power. We …nd evidence that OPEC exerted substantial market power between 1986 and 2009, the period analyzed in this paper. Then, using the same data but instead assuming that OPEC is a competitive producer, we reestimated the model and compared its …t to the data. We …nd that the competitive model does not capture the speci…c characteristics of the global oil market. In particular, it fails to obtain signi…cant demand and supply elasticities. We conclude that the linear (in logs) competitive system may lead to a misspeci…cation bias. Using the parameters of the dominant …rm model, we show that world GDP has been the main driving force of oil prices over the last two decades. Furthermore, rising production costs have contributed to an increase in oil prices after 2004.
The results in this paper suggest some avenues for further research. First, we used a static model augmented by dynamic factors (lag structure) and found that these were important for OPEC behavior. Therefore, a dynamic approach to understand capacity, production, and pricing seems a natural step. One strand of the literature, which builds on Hotelling (1931), singles out resource depletion as the dynamic factor to explain the path of oil prices. However, attempts to explain long-run prices by focusing on resource scarcity, see, for example, Pindyck (1978) , Lin (2010) , and Jovanovic (2013), have had limited success; this may re ‡ect the fact that the size of oil reserves has not changed much over the last 30 years -new discoveries have compensated for current extraction (Smith, 2009 ). 22 An alternative strategy would be to add dynamics to demand (due to …nancial speculation) or supply (due to inventories). This would add persistency and volatility to prices, thereby providing a foundation for the model to account for the big swings in prices after 2000.
Second, instead of assuming that OPEC acts as a cost-minimizing cartel we could model a game between the OPEC member countries. This would, however, require detailed data on costs of production for each OPEC country; we have no access to such data. Finally, it could be interesting to relax some of the common assumptions used in time series analysis of the oil market, like …xed supply, and specify a cointegration framework with simultaneous demand and supply. 22 Although our model builds on oil producers solving a static optimization problem, which is in contrast to the standard approach used in resource economics where a producer of an exhaustible resource solves an intertemporal optimization problem in order to …nd the path of extraction that maximizes pro…ts, our estimates may still re ‡ect the economic importance of the physical limitation of the stock of oil. The reason is that the solution of the intertemporal optimization problem can be summarized by a marginal resource (scarcity) rent, which can be seen as an additional cost component for the oil producer. The marginal resource rent is positive if either the physical limitation of the resource is binding, that is, the resource owner's pro…ts would increase if, hypothetically, more of the resource was available, or marginal cost of extraction is increasing and the cheapest …elds are extracted …rst, meaning that the more oil is extracted today, the higher the cost of extraction will be tomorrow. In our model OPEC's price-setting rule and non-OPEC's supply function are closely related to their marginal cost functions, and hence the estimated parameters should re ‡ect the marginal resource rent of each group.
[28] Kaufmann, Robert K. 3. We construct the 99th percentile interval using the quantiles of the bootstrap sampling distribution of b : b 0:5% < < b 99:5% : (10), (11) , and (13). 
